I argue that the opening line of the _Phaedrus_ proleptically encapsulates the major themes of the dialogue and that paying attention to the opening line enables us to strengthen the identification of psychagogy as the key unifying thread of the whole dialogue. In particular, I argue that the opening line foreshadows the quarrel between Lysias and Socrates over the practical guidance of Phaedrus’ soul; the prominence of friendship in the philosophical form of life; the pertinence of Socrates’ one-on-one, custom-built speeches, (...) vis-à-vis the later conceptualization of rhetoric; the definition of the soul as a source of never-ending movement; as well as the origin (_arché_) and destiny (_télos_) of human souls, following the lines of the Palinode. (shrink)

No contexto neoliberal, no qual imperam a cultura da auditoria e da meritocracia, a lógica do empreender-se a si mesmo e a visão de educação como mercadoria, convivemos com o mal-estar dentro e fora da docência. Nesse panorama, este artigo objetiva problematizar a racionalidade neoliberal vigente dentro e fora das salas de aula. Trata-se de uma análise discursiva de depoimentos de três professores de ensino superior sobre o cuidado (de si), a partir de ferramentas teórico-analíticas de Foucault, com o intuito (...) de apontar em que medida os efeitos de sentido da responsabilização do sujeito por suas escolhas emergem em seus depoimentos. A análise remete-nos à presença dos modos de objetivação, por exemplo, às técnicas (pós-)modernas de gestão do tempo, qualidade muito apreciada no contexto neoliberal, na incessante busca da produtividade, da eficácia/eficiência e do empreendedorismo de si. Porém, a análise também sinalizou o desejo de cuidar(-se) mais e melhor, sendo a boa gestão do tempo vista pelos professores como uma das formas de realizá-lo. Embora tais estratégias estejam permeadas de/por técnicas neoliberais de governamentalidade, visando, de diversas maneiras, a conduzir nossas condutas, não objetivamos criticá-las, mas apenas descortinar de que maneira o uso de técnicas de gestão do tempo, paradoxalmente necessárias para (con/sobre)viver no mundo contemporâneo, nos conduzem de forma sub-reptícia. Nesse contexto, o cuidado de si, como entendido por Michel Foucault, no sentido de invenção de novas formas de vida poderia emergir como possibilidade de produzir contracondutas, apostando na relação consigo como uma alternativa, uma forma de resistência diante do poder, cuidado este, por vezes, sufocado pela competitividade generalizada que nos governa. (shrink)

Este artigo compara e contrasta dois conceitos filosóficos provenientes de distintas linhagens de pensamento: de um lado, o _clinamen _de Lucrécio; do outro, o _conatus _de Espinosa. O que fomentou minha pesquisa foi uma conjugação dessas noções tal como proposto por Deleuze no apêndice de seu _Logique du sens_. Nesse sentido, a primeira seção está orientada tendo em vista uma elucidação da filosofia de Lucrécio — consequentemente, também a de Epicuro — e, especificamente, uma interpretação do desvio dos átomos ou (...) _clinamen_ em combinação com o tópico da liberdade. A segunda seção se dedica a clarificar a metafísica de Espinosa e a acomodação do tema da liberdade dentro de seu robusto enquadramento necessitário, entrelaçado com o motivo do _conatus _ou esforço de auto-preservação. Contra a leiture de Deleuze, entretanto, argumentarei que _clinamen _e _conatus _pertencem à sistemas metafísicos que são praticamente incompatíveis e que corroboram um entendimento diferente sobre liberdade e necessidade. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine phenomenologically the structure of the normative noema, which I call the “nomothetic noema.” I distinguish the meaning content, its normative characters, which I call “ductive forces”, and its modes of givenness. Next, I introduce the traditional difference between modalities de re and de dicto. I argue that the current tendency, in deontic logic, to treat deontic expressions as operators over sentences induces, at least on the syntactic surface, a de dicto reading. I then discuss some (...) of the theoretical decisions that underlie deontic logic, starting from two basic asymmetries between modal alethic logic and deontic logic. The decisive point is to recover a strong sense of permission that I equate with the factor of free agency, which is difficult to formalize. Finally, I return to the analysis of the nomothetic noema and try to show how a de re reading is better suited to account for normative intentionality. I simultaneously introduce the concept of status-imposing norms, which must be formulated with a normative use of the copulas “is” and “has.” I conclude that the treatment of normative expressions is more appropriate when they are understood as complex copulas, irreducible to assertive sentences, rather than as operators over whole sentences. I emphasize on this occasion that, from a phenomenological point of view and within the framework of genetic analysis, the primitive basic datum is the freedom of agency, on which the normative domain of assigning statuses to agents, obligations, and prohibitions is built. (shrink)

In this paper I discuss Berkeley’s theories about vision, perception of distance, and the foundations of Geometry. I start with Locke’s answer to Molineaux’s problem and the criticisms Berkeley addressed to it. I explain the fundamentais of Berkeley’s theory about our cognitive shaping of the visual field and the type of connections that visual data establishes with data from the haptic field. I show how interesting are Berkeley’s conceptions for a phenomenology of perception, and, eventually, I carried some phenomenological evidence (...) against Berkeley’s too much strict location of the idea of distance in the haptic field alone. (shrink)

I intend to understand from a phenomenological point of view the relationship between figurative consciousnesses (Bildbewusstsein) and other non-original presentations (Vergegenwiirtigungen) such as expectations, recollections or fantasies. I centre my analyses in the difference between figurative consciousness, on the one hand, and a modality of fantasy I cal! “daydream consciousness”, on the other. I stress that figurative consciousness implies apure observational ego, whereas day-dream consciousness is a free construction of the ego’s own personal story. The freedom of”day dream consciousness” has, (...) nevertheless, some important constraints. I emphasize the constraints that come from the passive and affective life of the ego. Finally, I propose new criteria for the phenomenological differentiation between the several kinds of acts of non-original presentation. (shrink)

In what follows, I intend to address an issue which is at the boundaries of the phenomenological method of reflective explication, and that, in this sense, points to some limitations of the phenomenological approach to consciousness and mind. I am referring to an aporetic situation that is at the heart of the phenomenological analysis of passivity. On the one hand, phenomenology shows, at least indirectly, a passive life that is beyond the first steps of the activity of the ego in (...) the receptive, affective life. This is something that is beyond the rising of an ego, and from which a phenomenology of the ego-form of subjective life could be addressed. On the other hand, the analytic and conceptual tools of the phenomenological method have no grips on this basic realm of subjective life. As a result, Husserl’s analysis of passivity starts with the evidence of a pre-affective, pre-egoic realm, from which a phenomenology of the ego could be developed. However, Husserl’s analyses end up with the denegation of this dimension, as if it was invisible for the phenomenological method. As a consequence, the starting point of the analysis is not passivity proper, but rather the primitive forms of receptivity, which is already a first layer of the activity of the ego. Instead of an analysis of the ego-polarization (the “birth” of the ego), the egoic layer of conscious life is simply presupposed. A phenomenology of the ego-form is, thus, at the same time promised and denied. This aporetic situation is visible in the alteration of the concept of a passive pre-givenness in Husserl’s Analysis Concerning Passive Synthesis. (shrink)

Gustavo de Fraga was one of the most influential Portuguese phenomenologists. He had a deep understanding of the Husserlian as well as of the Heideggerian phenomenology. One of his major concerns was the connection between these thinkers, and the resettlement of metaphysical questions some step beyond the works of both. In so doing, Gustavo de Fraga took an original stance in the field of Phenomenology, combining conceptual and poetic experiences of thought.

While not a phenomenologist, Fernando Gil was highly interested in some aspects of Husserl’s work. One of these aspects was Husserl’s theory of evidence. ln a notable book entitled Traité de l’évidence, he developed a throughout theory of evidence, paying close attention to the most important insights Husserl exposed his works. Gil’s theory of evidence is at the same time rooted in Phenomenology and extended beyond it in as much as he locates the first dimension of evidence ma primitive stratum (...) hallucinating aesthesia from desire. Accounting for evidence as threefold process, going from aesthesia to presence, and then to the intellectual grasping of an individual object, the most interesting feature of his theory is the of evidence as a hallucinating process, encompassing all strata of sensitive, perceptive, and conceptual life. (shrink)

What, if any, are the limits of the Husserlian concept of Gegebenheit? Is there a limit beyond which nothing can be seen by the phenomenologist? In asking these questions, we allude to a distinction typical of Kantian criticism: “Grenze” or “Schranke”, limit or boundary? These same questions are reformulated in a famous review of Ideen I by Paul Natorp, a Marburg neo-Kantian who directly attacks the unlimited scope Husserl gives to the phenomenological principle of intuition. From a phenomenological point of (...) view, however, the Achilles’ heel of the critical method lies in the impossibility of accessing by intuition, beyond phenomena, the thing-in-itself. A major consequence is that the phenomenological dissolution of the “Grenze” prescribes a limitless opening to the horizon of phenomena. But if we can speak of a limitless openness, it is because in a certain way everything gives itself to be seen. What kind of vision is this? And what kind of Gegebenheit is at work here? The Husserlian answer lies in the recovery of a concept, the “idea in the Kantian sense”, without its counterpart, the “limit”, whereas for Kant as well as for Natorp it is precisely the concept of “limit” that characterizes the gnoseological status of the “idea”. (shrink)

El presente trabajo trata de ofrecer una posibilidad de abordaje de la perspectiva de género en 2º de la ESO mediante el recurso a las Novelas ejemplares de Cervantes como base para la aplicación del Flipped Classroom y del Aprendizaje Basado en Proyectos. Todo ello se aborda desde la consideración de que es posible cambiar las relaciones de género en la enseñanza mediante la didáctica crítica y mediante el tratamiento de las diferencias de género como constructos sociales y culturales.

A partir de las reflexiones que en su O cosmopolitismo do pobre desarrolla Silviano Santiago, propondremos un enfoque alternativo al actual modelo de enseñanza nacional, o nacionalista (cuya sinonimia asumimos), de las literaturas, las culturas e incluso de las lenguas. Para ello, procedemos a problematizar-deconstruir la estructura ideológica nacionalista (Anthony Smith, Hobsbawm, Anderson), defendiendo las ventajas científicas y políticas de un enfoque transterritorial de los estudios culturales, lingüísticos y literarios.

RESUMO No Livro I, parte IV, do "Tratado da natureza humana", Hume desenvolve aquilo que vamos chamar de lógica da ficção. Não se trata de um simples erro da imaginação enquanto fantasia, mas de uma propensão a criar ideias, entidades e objetos a partir das percepções presentes na mente. O que resulta daí é um sentido rico e novo de ficção que permite a Hume desenvolver uma história natural da filosofia, descrevendo a gênese inevitável de conceitos metafísicos. Partindo de uma (...) inspiração kantiana, iremos abordar esse tema ressaltando as semelhanças e diferenças entre as ficções naturais e a ilusão transcendental. ABSTRACT In Book I, part IV, of the "Treatise of Human Nature", Hume develops what we will call logic of fiction. It is not the case of a mere error of imagination as fancy, but a tendency to feign ideas, entities and objects from the perceptions in the mind. The result is a rich and new sense of fiction that allows Hume to establish a natural history of Philosophy, describing the unavoidable genesis of metaphysical concepts. From a Kantian point of view, we will approach this subject by highlighting the similarities as well as the differences between the natural fictions and the transcendental illusion. (shrink)

O artigo descreve sinteticamente as mudanças observadas nas funções e composição do Conse­lho de Estado durante a Monarquia Constitucional, procurando indagar a relevância política de uma instituição concebida desde o início para aconselhar o monarca. Não obstante a parcimó­nia das fontes coevas, e até alguns exemplos contraditórios, parece inquestionável que em vários momentos críticos as decisões políticas do monarca foram influenciadas pela opinião do­minante no Conselho de Estado. A finalizar, o artigo apresenta uma biografia colectiva dos 73 indivíduos que foram (...) nomeados conselheiros de Estado efectivos entre 1833 e 1910 – e que po­demos definir como o núcleo central da elite governante –, focando algumas características sociodemográficas (naturalidade, idade, educação, profissão, títulos nobiliárquicos) e tipos de experiência política. (shrink)